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Abstract	
The	paper	focuses	on	Britain’s	relationship	with	Malaya	shortly	before	and	after	its	
independence	 from	 the	 British	 Empire.	 The	 paper	 looks	 at	 the	 negotiations	
concerning	 the	 financial	 settlement	prior	 to	 independence.	Britain	sought	 to	keep	
Malaya	within	 the	Sterling	Area	at	all	 costs,	 even	after	de	 jure	 convertibility	had	
been	achieved,	due	to	 its	high	dollar	earning	capacity,	which	remained	 important	
due	to	persistent	trade	deficits	with	the	US	since	the	end	of	the	Second	World	War.	
The	 paper	 argues	 that	 this	 settlement,	 while	 seemingly	 very	 generous	 for	 an	
independent	Malaya,	was	still	very	much	intended	to	maintain	Britain’s	role	within	
the	global	economy,	to	ensure	Sterling’s	status	as	an	international	currency,	and	to	
support	conditions	for	British	economic	growth.	
	
Introduction	
This	paper	charts	Britain’s	negotiations	with	Malaya	over	its	eventual	independence,	and	Malaya’s	
relationship	with	Britain	immediately	after	independence.	The	discussions	were	split	in	two.	The	
first,	a	set	of	constitutional	talks	held	in	January	and	February	1956,	laid	down	the	basic	form	that	
Malayan	 independence	 would	 take.	 These	 talks	 were	 followed	 by	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 special	
commission,	 which	 toured	 Malaya	 until	 late-1956,	 publishing	 a	 report,	 the	 Reid	 Report,	 on	
independence	 in	March	 1957.1	Prior	 to	 the	 publication	 of	 this	 report,	 however,	 from	December	
1956	to	January	1957,	were	more	substantial	discussions	on	the	nature	of	mutual	defense	and	the	
specifics	of	financial	arrangement	post-independence.2	This	paper	focuses	on	the	latter	of	these	
and	seeks	to	understand	these	discussions	in	terms	of	the	goals	of	British	state	managers.	
	 The	paper	begins	with	a	brief	overview	of	the	lead-up	to	the	Constitutional	Talks	in	early-
1956,	focusing	principally	on	a	disagreement	between	Britain	and	Malaya	over	British	imports	of	
synthetic	 rubber	 from	 the	 dollar	 area.	 The	 second	 section	 focuses	 specifically	 on	 the	
Constitutional	 Talks,	 which	were	 dominated	 by	 the	 issue	 of	 dollar	 spending.	 The	 paper’s	 third	
section	deals	with	 the	 late-1956	Financial	Discussions	and	 the	 issue	of	development	aid	 for	 the	
Malayan	 economy.	 The	 final	 section	 covers	 the	 immediate	 post-independence	 period.	
Throughout	all	of	these	sections,	the	enduring	theme	is	Malaya’s	continuing	value	as	a	high	net	
dollar	earner	to	the	Sterling	Area’s	dollar	pool,	and	its	persistent	importance	to	the	maintenance	
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of	 British	 international	 economic	 policy.	While	Malaya	 begins	 to	 act	more	 independently,	 and	
indeed	 receives	 formal	 independence,	 from	 Britain,	 Malaya	 simply	 acts	 more	 independently	
within	 the	 relationship	 that	 already	 exists,	 using	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 relationship	 to	 its	 own	
advantage	and	not	actually	challenging	its	basic	structure.		
	 The	understanding	by	Malaya’s	own	state	managers	of	its	value	to	the	Sterling	Area,	and	
hence	to	British	economic	and	monetary	policy,	reveals	the	nuance	of	this	imperial	relationship.	
The	 institutional	arrangement	provided	by	 the	Sterling	Area	permitted	Britain	 to	centrally	pool	
convertible	currency	reserves	and	for	Sterling	to	be	used	as	a	reserve	and	trading	currency	by	a	
number	of	states.	It	is	this	arrangement	that	simultaneously	permitted	the	domination	by	Britain	
of	Malaya	to	its	own	ends	but	also	for	Malaya	to	recognise	its	own	value	and	to	leverage	benefits	
from	Britain,	resulting	 in	development,	economic	growth	and	increased	autonomy	from	Britain.	
The	 relationship	 between	 Britain	 and	 Malaya,	 both	 before	 and	 after	 independence,	 offers	 an	
insight	 into	 the	 nature	 of	 imperialism.	Rather	 than	 seeing	 this	 relationship	 as	 simple	 one-way	
domination,	 as	 classical	 and	 dependency	 theories	 of	 imperialism	 have	 argued,	 this	 episode	
reveals	the	collaboration	between	and	shared	goals	of	both	British	and	Malayan	state	managers.3	
This	 is	 not	 to	 suggest	 that	 imperialism	 is	 a	meeting	 of	 equals,	 or	 a	 conspiracy	 between	 state	
managers.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 this	 is	 a	 fundamentally	 unequal	 relationship	 that	 developed	
throughout	the	19th	and	20th	Centuries	according	to	the	needs	of	the	British	state	and	economy.	
As	such,	it	is	imperative	to	understand	this	relationship	as	anchored	in	the	context	of	both	British	
state	managerial	goals	and	the	demands	of	the	global	economy.	
British-Malayan	Relations	
The	subject	of	Malayan	 independence	has	 received	some	noteworthy	scholarly	attention.	From	
broader	 accounts	 of	 British	 imperial	 relations,	 including	 those	 of	 Krozewski	 and	 Hinds,	 whose	
accounts	 of	 colonial	 independence,	 such	 as	 Malaya’s,	 rest	 on	 a	 curious	 mix	 of	 continuity	 and	
discontinuity	 based	 upon	 the	 formal	 end	 of	 empire	 and	 the	 existence	 of	 sympathetic	 elites	 in	
post-colonial	 states.4	Their	 accounts,	 however,	 focus	 on	 the	 broader	 trend	 of	 decolonization	
rather	 than	 specific	 cases.	More	 specific	 scholarly	 attention	 derives	 from	 the	 work	 of	 Schenk,	
Strange,	White	and	Harper.5	Their	more	focused	analyses	offer	stronger	evidence	for	continuity,	
particularly	 in	 the	 case	 of	White,	who	offers	 substantial	 archival	 evidence	 to	 support	 claims	 of	
continuity.6	
	 However,	 lacking	 in	 their	 accounts	 is	 an	 attempt	 to	 situate	 Malayan	 independence	 in	
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terms	of	 the	broader	political	 economic	 environment	Britain	 faced	 in	 the	 1950s.	White	 focuses	
more	on	Malayan-Asian	trade	patterns,	while	Harper	focuses	on	the	making	of	the	post-colonial	
Malayan	state	–	a	similar	focus	as	Amin	and	Stockwell,	albeit	in	less	radical	terms.7	Indeed,	Harper	
notes	 that	 his	 goal	 was	 to	 understand	 decolonization	 “as	 seen	 from	 Malaya	 and	 not	 from	
London”.8	The	goal	of	this	paper	is	the	exact	opposite	to	Harper’s	work	and	seeks	to	understand	
how	British	state	managers	sought	to	retain	Malaya	within	the	Sterling	Area.	Also	lacking	in	their	
accounts	 is	 a	 critical	 analysis	 of	 why	 it	 remains	 in	 Malaya’s	 interests	 to	 remain	 a	 part	 of	 the	
Sterling	Area	and	to	link	this	with	Britain’s	political	and	economic	situation	at	the	time.	
	 Both	Strange	and	Schenk	provide	accounts	of	 the	establishment	of	 the	Malayan	Central	
Bank	 in	 1959,	 which	 was	 discussed	 at	 the	 negotiations	 over	 independence.9	Where	 Strange	
argues	 that	 Britain	 was	 resistant	 to	 its	 establishment	 due	 to	 a	 desire	 to	 have	 Malaya	 still	
economically	 dependent	 on	 Britain,	 Schenk	 argues	 that	 Malaya	 was	 not	 entirely	 enthusiastic	
about	the	prospect	of	 full	monetary	 independence	from	the	UK.	Schenk	argues	this	was	due	to	
both	the	potential	political	and	economic	difficulties	posed	by	uniting	Malaya	with	Singapore,	and	
the	desire	to	represent	institutional	continuity	after	independence	to	ensure	Malaya	remained	an	
enticing	 location	 for	 foreign	 investment.	 While	 both	 accounts	 are	 very	 interesting,	 Strange’s	
account	 provides	 no	 primary	 sources	 to	 support	 her	 conclusions,	 and	 Schenk’s	 account	 fails	 to	
provide	 a	 critical	 explanation	 behind	 the	 logic	 for	Malaya’s	 reticence	 to	 enthusiastically	 pursue	
monetary	independence.	For	example,	there	is	no	reflection	upon	the	fact	that	both	Malaya	and	
Britain	 see	 continuity	within	 the	 Sterling	Area	 as	 a	means	 for	 economic	 stability	–	 it	 is	merely	
presented	 as	 the	 reason	 for	 Malayan	 reluctance	 to	 pursue	 monetary	 independence 10	
Furthermore,	this	paper,	while	certainly	concerned	with	economic	and	monetary	issues,	does	not	
intend	to	focus	at	great	depth	on	the	establishment	of	the	Malayan	Central	Bank,	its	origins	in	the	
International	 Bank	mission	 to	Malaya	 in	 1954,	 or	 the	 specific	 nature	 of	 the	 negotiations	 in	 its	
setup.	
The	goal	of	this	paper	is	not	to	dismiss	the	literature	but	rather	to	emphasize	aspects	of	it	
through	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 negotiations	 over	 the	 political	 economic	 consequences	 of	
independence.	All	agree	that	Malaya	remained	important	to	the	Sterling	Area	into	the	1950s	due	
to	its	dollar-earning	capacity.11	However,	this	point	tends	to	get	lost	in	a	desire	to	find	instances	of	
discontinuity.	Either	these	approaches	tend	to	focus	on	the	broader	 issue	of	decolonization	and	
hence	 miss	 the	 specifics	 of	 each	 relationship12,	 or	 focus	 on	 the	 specifics	 of	 British-Malayan	
relations	 but	 do	 not	 interrogate	 the	 nature	 of	 that	 relationship.13	As	 such,	 this	paper	 does	 not	
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reject	the	literature	but	seeks	to	fill	a	gap	in	understanding	the	relationship	between	Britain	and	
Malaya.	 To	 do	 this,	 the	 paper	 will	 analyze	 the	moment	 of	 the	 apparent	 shift	 from	 ‘formal’	 to	
‘informal’	empire,	looking	at	the	negotiations	over	independence,	to	understand	how,	why	and	on	
what	terms	Britain	wanted	Malaya	to	remain	in	its	imperial	economic	domain,	the	Sterling	Area.	
Finally,	 it	 is	also	worth	noting	that,	while	mentioned	in	a	number	of	works,	close	analysis	of	the	
negotiations	 over	 independence	 themselves	 is	 also	 lacking	 and	 so	 empirical	 questions	 can	 be	
raised:	what	were	the	key	issues	and	problems	in	these	negotiations?14	How	were	they	resolved?	
And	how	do	they	tie	into	the	broader	political	economic	situation	at	the	time?	
Synthetic	Rubber	
Initially,	the	Constitutional	Talks	in	London	in	early	1956	looked	set	to	be	dominated	by	the	issue	
of	 imports	 of	 synthetic	 rubber	 to	 Britain.	 The	 Colonial	 Office	 had	 been	 approached	 by	 the	
Federation’s	Minister	for	Economic	Affairs,	who	wanted	to	know	why	Britain	was	using	the	dollar	
pool	to	purchase	synthetic	rubber	rather	than	simply	purchasing	Malayan	natural	rubber.15	There	
was	some	anger	in	Malaya	that,	for	all	Britain’s	declarations	of	support	concerning	development,	
Britain	 was	 unwilling	 to	 support	 the	 Malayan	 rubber	 industry	 with	 its	 custom.	 The	 British	
government	had	approved	an	import	programme	for	70,000	tons	of	synthetic	rubber	in	1956	from	
the	US,	which	corresponded	to	a	drop	in	orders	for	Malayan	natural	rubber	by	70,000	tons	for	that	
year.	
	 The	 Treasury	 responded	 to	 the	 request	 by	 pointing	 out	 that	 the	 UK	 abided	 by	 rules	
common	 to	 the	 entire	 Sterling	 Area	 –	dollar	 expenditure	was	 acceptable	 as	 long	 as	 it	 was	 for	
essential	 purchases.	 Synthetic	 rubber	 imports	 were	 considered	 essential	 purchases	 as	 the	
efficiency	 and	 competitiveness	 of	 the	 UK	 rubber	 manufacturing	 industry	 relied	 on	 them.	 The	
Treasury	maintained	that	the	import	programme	in	1956	was	not	excessive	and	therefore	was	a	
justifiable	use	of	dollars.	The	Treasury	also	refused	to	review	the	programme.16	
	 The	Colonial	Office	 sent	 a	 letter	 to	Donald	MacGillivray,	 the	High	Commissioner	 of	 the	
Federation	of	Malaya,	a	few	days	after	 the	 initial	Treasury	response	to	reiterate	the	reasons	for	
the	 synthetic	 rubber	 imports,	 and	 the	 stubbornness	 about	 maintaining	 them.	 In	 the	 letter,	
Lennox-Boyd,	 the	 Colonial	 Secretary,	 emphasised	 that	 this	 policy	was	 entirely	 consonant	with	
Sterling	Area	 rules	but	aimed	ultimately	at	 the	 convertibility	of	Sterling.	This	 aim	could	not	be	
accomplished	until	the	Sterling	Area’s	balance	of	payments	had	been	strengthened	and	the	only	
means	of	achieving	that	was	to	 improve	the	efficiency,	productivity	and	competitiveness	of	 the	
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British	economy.	The	argument	then	proposed	by	the	Colonial	Office	and	the	Treasury	was	that	
the	import	of	synthetic	rubber	was	justifiable	 in	terms	of	Britain	and	the	Sterling	Area’s	general	
economic	policy.17	
	 Average	 natural	 rubber	 prices	 in	 1955	 had	 reached	 a	 post-Korean	 war	 high	 of	 around	
34p/lb.,	which	 had	 stimulated	 the	 competitiveness	of	 synthetic	 rubber	 production.18	The	use	 of	
synthetic	 rubber	 was	 also	 preferred	 for	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 rubber	 manufacturing	 end	 uses	 and	
Lennox-Boyd	argued	that	the	import	of	synthetic	rubber	in	this	instance	would	greatly	reduce	the	
need	 to	 import	 any	 more	 in	 the	 future.	 Furthermore,	 since	 European	 rubber	 manufacturing	
industries	had	not	had	access	to	Britain’s	rubber	markets,	their	industries	were	considerably	more	
efficient	and	competitive	than	Britain’s	own.19	
While	Lennox-Boyd	was	very	eager	to	emphasise	that	Malaya’s	rubber	and	tin	 industries	
were	essential	to	the	dollar	earnings	of	the	Sterling	Area,	their	protection	could	not	come	at	the	
price	of	British	and	the	Sterling	Area’s	development	as	a	whole.	Indeed,	the	Colonial	Office	made	
clear	 that	 import	 controls	 on	 essential	 dollar	 imports	 were	 contrary	 to	 the	 Sterling	 Area’s	
economic	policy	and	also	asserted	that	GATT	obligations	required	that	Britain	should	not	employ	
quantitative	 import	 restrictions	 for	 protective	 purposes,	 despite	 using	 exactly	 the	 opposite	
argument	in	the	mid-1940s	to	justify	quantitative	import	restrictions.20	The	Colonial	Office’s	final	
point	was	 to	say	 that	 imports	of	Malayan	 rubber	 into	Britain	were	of	 such	a	 small	amount	 that	
swapping	synthetic	 imports	for	Malayan	 imports	would	have	 little	effect	 indeed.	Natural	rubber	
was	 principally	 consumed	 in	 the	 US	 market,	 where	 natural	 and	 synthetic	 rubber	 was	 in	 free	
competition.21		
	 The	arguments	put	forward	by	both	the	Colonial	Office	and	the	Treasury	to	the	Federation,	
and	 subsequently	 reiterated	 by	 the	 High	 Commissioner	 in	 Malaya,	 settled	 the	 matter	 on	 the	
specific	 issue	 of	 synthetic	 rubber	 imports.	 However,	 the	 concern	 over	 the	 issue	 was	 merely	 a	
manifestation	 of	 a	 more	 fundamental	 problem	 running	 throughout	 the	 Britain-Malaya	
relationship:	the	use	of	dollars	earned	by	Malaya.	This	became	the	theme	of	the	Financial	Working	
Group	in	the	Constitutional	Talks	held	in	London	between	January	and	February	1956.		
Dollar	Imports	
In	a	Bank	memo,	a	copy	of	the	brief	for	the	Malayan	Minister	for	Economic	Affairs	was	discussed	
by	John	Fisher,	the	Deputy	Chief	Cashier,	Sir	George	Bolton,	Executive	Director	at	the	Bank,	and	
Lucius	 Thompson-McCausland,	 Adviser	 to	 the	 Bank’s	 Governor,	 in	 detail.	 Financial	 issues	 and	
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exchange	policy	were	to	be	discussed	in	relation	to	Malaya’s	imports	from	the	dollar	area	and	its	
dollar	spending,	as	well	as	its	future	financial	ties	with	Britain	and	the	Sterling	Area.	The	Minister’s	
brief	contained	three	demands,	and	one	offer:	
• Full	 membership	 of	 the	 Sterling	 Area,	 so	 that	 Malaya	 will	 be	 consulted	 on	 matters	 of	
common	policy	and	will	be	invited	to	attend	Finance	Ministers’	meetings;	
• Britain	was	 to	 accept	 that	Malaya’s	 capital	 requirements	were	 to	be	met	 in	 the	London	
market,	to	the	tune	of	£20m	over	the	next	five	years;	
• Malaya	was	to	have	freedom	to	import	from	dollar	sources,	and	to	have	free	access	to	its	
own	 dollar	 surplus	 in	 order	 to	 develop	 its	 economy	 to	 expand	 trade	with	 neighbouring	
countries;	
• In	 return	 for	 the	 above,	 Malaya	 would	 pledge	 full	 collaboration	 and	 cooperation	 on	 all	
matters	affecting	Sterling	and	convertibility.22		
The	first	demand	was	not	discussed	because	 it	was	wholly	acceptable.	For	the	second	demand,	
the	Treasury	reported	it	could	not	assure	the	Malayan	delegation	that	this	was	possible,	though	
there	were	precedents	for	that	to	occur.23	The	third	demand	was	considered	the	most	important	
and	 an	 immediate	 issue	 for	 the	 Talks,	 and	 saw	 the	 Bank	 provide	 an	 insight	 into	 divisions	 on	
Sterling	Area	policy	within	the	state	management.	
“If	Malayan	ministers	press	for	 freedom	on	dollar	 imports	and	 if	 this	 is	 largely	
conceded	(whether	for	political	reasons	or	otherwise)	it	will	make	an	irreparable	
breach	in	the	wall	of	dollar	restrictions	around	the	Colonies	which	the	Treasury	
seek	to	maintain	–	and	which	we	are	anxious	to	lower”.24		
Once	again,	the	Bank’s	major	concern	was	that	it	would	set	a	dangerous	precedent	for	the	
Sterling	Area.	 If	 this	were	 permitted,	 it	would	 be	 difficult	 to	 deny	 similar	 concessions	 to	 other	
countries	 (e.g.	 the	 colonies	 of	 the	 former	 British	West	 Africa)	 and	 therefore,	 according	 to	 the	
memo,	the	Colonial	Office	too	would	have	to	abandon	its	current	efforts	to	keep	all	Colonies	on	
the	 same	 exchange	 policy.25 	The	 Bank	 then	 was	 much	 more	 committed	 to	 the	 Collective	
Approach	than	the	Colonial	Office	or	the	Treasury,	who	were	still	committed	to	the	maintenance	
of	exchange	controls	around	the	Sterling	Area.	However,	by	this	point,	 the	Collective	Approach	
had	 been	widely	 accepted	 by	British	 state	managers	 and	 the	 Sterling	Area	 and,	 therefore,	 the	
Bank,	as	Burnham	argues,	was	much	more	eager	to	act	swiftly	to	achieve	Convertibility.26	
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	 One	possibility	of	getting	around	Malaya’s	demand	for	free	dollar	imports	was	to	use	Hong	
Kong	as	a	‘back	door’	through	which	Malaya	could	buy	all	the	dollar	goods	it	needed.	Hong	Kong’s	
special	 status	 was	 brought	 up	 by	 the	Malayan	 delegation,	 since	 Hong	 Kong	 had	much	 greater	
dollar	freedom	than	any	country	in	the	Sterling	Area.27	However,	this	was	because	Hong	Kong	was	
an	entrepot	area	for	China,	Korea,	Macao,	and	Taiwan	and	sold	large	quantities	of	goods	to	these	
territories	and	 in	 return	 received	 large	quantities	of	dollars,	which	Hong	Kong	was	permitted	 to	
use	freely.28	Hong	Kong’s	dollar	earnings	actually	provided	a	net	contribution	to	the	Sterling	Area,	
while	Sterling	accounts	 in	 the	 colony	were	 restricted	and	 the	Hong	Kong	government	enforced	
this	 by	 strictly	 limiting	 the	 sale	 and	 purchase	 of	 Sterling.	 Furthermore,	 the	Malayan	 dollar	was	
linked	to	Sterling	through	statute	but	the	Hong	Kong	dollar	was	a	de	facto	link,	with	no	strict	basis	
in	law.	Unlike	Malaya,	Hong	Kong	was	not	legally	obliged	to	back	its	currency	with	Sterling	or	to	
issue	against	Sterling	at	a	fixed	rate.	As	such,	Hong	Kong	was	seen	as	a	very	special	case.29		
“A	free	market	like	Hong	Kong’s	is	contrary	to	the	fundamental	principles	of	the	
Sterling	Area	and	to	HMG’s	obligations	to	the	IMF.	The	arrangements	in	Hong	
Kong	are	 in	effect	a	compromise	between	 its	 two	roles	as	an	outlet	 for	China	
and	neighbouring	countries	and	as	a	Sterling	Area	 territory;	 they	can	only	be	
justified	 because	 of	 the	 exceptional	 circumstances,	 which	 are	 of	 over-riding	
importance	to	the	economic	existence	of	the	territory	concerned.”30		
	 It	 was	 then	 put	 to	 the	 Malayan	 delegation	 that	 there	 was	 no	 justifiable	 comparison	
between	 the	Malayan	and	Hong	Kong	economies,	which	 they	were	 satisfied	with.31	John	Fisher,	
Deputy	 Chief	 Cashier	 at	 the	 Bank,	made	 one	 further	 point	 that	 the	most	 basic	 and	 convincing	
argument	against	a	Malayan	free	market	was	Malayan	development.32	Malaya	required	stability	in	
order	 to	develop	and,	 as	 such,	 fluctuating	exchange	 rates	would	 run	 contrary	 to	 this	 since	 they	
would	 require	 a	 barrier	 between	Malaya	 and	 the	 Sterling	Area	 instead	 of	 the	 current	 statutory	
arrangement.33		
	 Given	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 comparison	 between	Malaya	 and	Hong	Kong,	 a	member	 of	 the	
Malayan	delegation	approached	the	Chief	General	Manager	of	Chartered	Bank,	Howard	Morford,	
to	tell	him	that	the	Malayan	delegation	was	now	considering	setting	up	Singapore	as	a	free	market	
in	 US	 dollars,	 as	 Hong	 Kong.	 Morford	 asked	 PL	 Hogg	 at	 the	 Bank	 to	 see	 if	 there	 were	 good	
arguments	that	could	be	mustered	by	either	the	Bank	or	the	Treasury	to	dissuade	the	Malayans	of	
this	course	of	action.34		
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	 The	purpose	behind	 this	determination	 to	achieve	 free	use	of	dollars	was,	of	course,	 for	
Malaya	 to	 expand	 its	 primary	 and	 secondary	 industries	 and	 a	 free	 market	 was	 seen	 by	 the	
Malayan	delegation	as	 attracting	overseas	 capital	 to	 invest	 in	 the	Malayan	economy.	However,	
the	Bank	was	adamant	that	there	was	no	guarantee	of	this	and	that	a	free	market	could	actually	
encourage	instability	and	uncertainty.35	Further,	if	it	were	just	Singapore	to	become	a	free	market	
then	exactly	the	same	arguments	applied	as	if	Malaya	as	a	whole	wished	to	have	a	free	market:	
exchange	 barriers	 would	 be	 required,	 it	 would	 strain	 the	 link	 between	 currencies,	 and	 it	 was	
entirely	 dissonant	 with	 Malaya’s	 professed	 intention	 of	 staying	 in	 the	 Sterling	 Area	 and	
committing	to	the	obligations	inherent	to	that.36	
	 By	the	end	of	the	Constitutional	Talks	in	mid-February	1956,	a	provisional	agreement	had	
been	 reached	 about	 the	 lead-up	 to	 the	 Federation’s	 independence.	 The	 Talks	 had	 led	 to	 an	
agreement	that	an	elected	Malayan	Finance	Minister	would	take	over	all	responsibility	for	internal	
and	 external	 finance	 from	 the	 (London-appointed)	 Financial	 Secretary	 with	 immediate	 effect.	
Malaya	would	remain	 in	the	Sterling	Area	after	 independence,	which	was	scheduled	for	August	
1957,	and	Malaya	would	send	delegates	to	all	future	meetings	of	Finance	Ministers.	Control	over	
the	Federation’s	dollar	spending	would	move	from	Whitehall	to	the	Federation	government,	who	
would	then	be	tasked	with	applying	Sterling	Area	policy	to	Malaya	as	a	whole.37	Assurances	were	
given	 to	 Malaya	 that	 “sympathetic	 consideration”	 would	 be	 given	 to	 Federation	 borrowing	 in	
London	 for	 development	 purposes.38	Furthermore,	 Britain	 pledged	 to	 give	 fair	 treatment	 to	
overseas	 capital	 investment	 in	 the	 Federation	 and	 agreed	 to	 aid	 in	 meeting	 the	 costs	 of	 the	
Emergency	after	independence.39	The	final	report	on	the	Constitutional	Conference	characterised	
the	agreement	made	between	Malayan	and	British	delegations	on	the	Sterling	Area	
“We	had	a	full	and	frank	discussion	of	the	Federation’s	position	in	the	Sterling	
Area.	 The	 Malayan	 Delegation	 indicated	 that	 it	 was	 the	 view	 of	 their	
Government	 that	 membership	 of	 the	 Sterling	 Area	 was	 to	 the	 common	
advantage	 of	 the	 Federation	 and	 the	 other	 members	 and	 that	 it	 was	 their	
intention	to	remain	in	it	after	attaining	full	self-government.	There	was	general	
recognition	 by	 the	United	Kingdom	 representatives	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 the	
Federation's	contribution	to	the	strength	of	the	Sterling	Area	through	the	direct	
earnings	of	dollars	from	rubber	and	tin.”40		
	 A	 letter	 from	 Herbert	 Brittain,	 second	 secretary	 at	 the	 Treasury,	 to	 Thomas	 Lloyd,	
Permanent	Under-Secretary	of	State	at	the	Colonial	Office,	a	week	after	the	Constitutional	Talks	
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emphasised	how	important	the	colonies	were	to	the	British	economy	and	how	crucial	it	was	still	
to	maintain	strict	limits	on	dollar	expenditure.	
“We	 cannot	 regard	 Colonial	 economies	 as	 ‘entirely	 external’	 to	 that	 of	 the	
United	 Kingdom.	 Such	 description	 would,	 indeed,	 have	 little	 meaning.	 For	
years	 now	 it	 has	 been	 necessary	 to	 emphasise	 the	 inter-connectedness	 of	
internal	and	external	problems,	and…	vigorous	internal	measures	are	necessary	
to	relieve	the	balance	of	payments…	The	fact	remains,	however,	that	external	
spending,	even	in	the	sterling	area,	has	a	more	direct	and	a	larger	effect	upon	
our	 reserves	and	the	status	of	sterling	 than	expenditure	at	home,	and	has	 for	
that	reason	to	be	examined	with	special	care.”41		
Colonial	Sterling	Balances	had	recently	risen	and	this	was	helpful	 to	Sterling’s	position	and	also	
therefore	to	Britain.42	However,	Brittain	emphasized	clearly	to	Lloyd	that	the	Colonies	could	not	
be	permitted	to	run	down	their	Sterling	Balances	by	spending	freely	as	this	would	still	place	too	
great	 a	 strain	on	 the	 reserves,	 they	would	dwindle	 to	nothing	 in	 the	process,	 and	 the	Colonies	
would	 suffer	 as	much	 from	 that	as	Britain.43	Britain’s	dollar	 reserves	 in	February	 1956	were	 still	
very	low	at	£77m,	with	gold	reserves	at	their	lowest	level	since	June	1953	at	£703m.44		
	 Immediately	 following	 the	 Constitutional	 Talks,	 a	 new	 Minister	 of	 Finance,	 as	 per	 the	
agreement	with	Britain,	was	appointed	in	the	Federation.	Colonel	Henry	Lee	was	a	Chinese	Malay	
who	had	been	bestowed	the	honorary	rank	of	Colonel	by	Chiang	Kai-Shek.	His	political	activities	
were	decidedly	anti-communist	and	he	was	a	very	wealthy	man,	holding	considerable	business	
interests	 in	both	 the	Federation	 in	Singapore	 in	 rubber	estates	and	 tin	mines.45	Lee,	 like	British	
officials,	did	not	want	to	see	Singapore	become	a	free	dollar	market.	Lee	became	the	key	figure	in	
all	of	Britain’s	 financial	discussions	with	Malaya	until	1959	and	during	this	 time	the	same	 issues	
dominate	Britain’s	relationship	with	Malaya,	even	after	independence.46	
	 The	Constitutional	Talks	had	cemented	Malaya’s	continued	position	as	a	central	element	
of	Sterling	Area	policy,	which	senior	British	state	managers	at	the	Bank	and	Colonial	Office	had	
been	eager	to	achieve.	The	subsequent	Financial	Discussions	in	late-1956,	however,	would	bring	
into	question	the	specifics	of	the	terms	set	up	by	the	Constitutional	Talks.		
Financial	Discussions	
In	early	June	1956,	Malayan	ministers	met	with	representatives	from	the	Eastern	Banks	to	discuss	
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the	setting	up	of	an	investment	corporation	to	stimulate	industrial	development	in	the	Federation	
to	the	tune	of	M$10m.	While	the	Banks	wanted	a	majority	government	share	in	the	corporation,	
the	 Federation	 government	 sought	 to	 have	 the	 corporation	 based	 on	 majority	 private	
investment.47		The	 Federation	was	 also	 using	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 Central	 Bank	 as	 a	
bargaining	chip	 for	 the	setting	up	of	 the	 investment	corporation	and,	 in	a	 letter	 to	 the	Bank	of	
England,	the	Mercantile	Bank	felt	that	the	setting	up	of	the	corporation	revealed	a	desire	to	cut	
ties	with	Singapore.48	
While	the	Colonial	Office	admitted	they	were	not	aware	of	the	creation	of	the	 Industrial	
Development	 Corporation,	 they	 informed	 the	 Bank	 that	 this	 was	 usual	 for	 colonies	 heading	
towards	 independence	 and	 there	 were	 precedents	 for	 it.	 However,	 they	 acknowledged	 that,	
ordinarily,	 the	Colonial	Development	and	Food	Corporation	(CDFC)	would	provide	funds	for	the	
corporation	but	the	Malayan	government	had	not	approached	the	CDFC	for	funds.49	Colonel	Lee	
also	 contacted	 the	 British	 government	 at	 this	 point	 to	 ask	 for	 financial	 aid	 for	 Malayan	
development;	however,	the	Colonial	Office	was	reticent	to	approve	any	funds	unless	the	details	of	
a	 specific	 development	 plan	 were	 provided	 but	 these	 had	 not	 yet	 been	 drawn	 up	 by	 the	
Federation.50		
	 Certainly,	the	Federation	was	very	eager	to	gain	access	to	large	amounts	of	ready	cash	to	
spend	 on	 development	 in	 the	 run	 up	 to	 independence.51	Indeed,	 by	 the	 end	 of	 June,	 Donald	
MacGillivray	telegrammed	Alan	Lennox-Boyd	to	 inform	him	that	 the	Federation	had	asked	him	
about	lifting	the	rubber	embargo	against	China.52	The	High	Commissioner	had	informed	Colonel	
Lee	 that	 the	 British	 government	would	 require	 an	 end-use	 certificate	 due	 to	 security	 concerns	
about	 its	application;	however,	this	would	probably	be	meaningless	and	therefore	he	suggested	
using	a	quantitative	restriction	instead	and	proposed	an	initial	limit	of	2000	tons	of	rubber.53	The	
embargo	on	 rubber	exports	 to	China	was	ultimately	 relaxed.	 It	was	 too	difficult	 to	get	end-use	
agreements	 from	 the	 Chinese	 government	 but	Malayan	 exports	 assured	 Sir	 Robert	 Black	 that	
their	 rubber	exports	were	used	only	 for	civilian	purposes.	These	shipments	constituted	 the	 first	
rubber	exports	to	China	from	Malaya	since	1951.54		
	 By	 August,	 however,	 Britain	 was	 forced	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 repercussions	 of	 the	
nationalization	of	the	Suez	Canal,	an	action	described	in	the	Bank	as	imperilling	“the	survival	of	
the	UK	and	the	Commonwealth,	and	represents	a	very	great	danger	to	Sterling”.55	A	letter	to	the	
Governor	 of	 the	 Bank	 highlighted	 that	 the	 use	 of	 economic	 warfare	 against	 Egypt	 would	 be	
detrimental	to	Britain,	especially	to	the	reserves.56	This	was	not	catastrophic	at	the	time,	as	the	
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reserves	 had	 reached	 a	 comparative	 highpoint	 with	 dollar	 reserves	 at	 £137m	 and	 with	 gold	
reserves	at	£722m.57	However,	 the	Suez	 crisis,	 due	 to	both	economic	warfare	and	 the	effect	on	
Sterling,	diminished	the	reserves	significantly.	By	the	end	of	August	dollar	reserves	had	fallen	to	
£88m,	and	by	the	end	of	November	had	fallen	again	to	£47m,	with	gold	reserves	at	£655m.58	
	 By	 even	 mid-November,	 George	 Bolton,	 in	 discussion	 with	 Leslie	 Rowan,	 agreed	 that	
Britain	could	not	continue	to	take	losses	as	they	had	been	and	still	hope	to	maintain	the	rate	of	
Sterling,	which	was	essential	since	if	that	rate	could	not	be	maintained,	“there	[was]	a	grave	risk	
of	the	Sterling	Area	coming	to	an	end”.59	They	agreed	that	an	appeal	to	the	US	to	help	maintain	
parity	was	necessary	since	“it	is	a	major	interest	of	the	US	to	maintain	Sterling	and	to	prevent	the	
collapse	of	the	Sterling	Area”;	however,	this	was	not	forthcoming	and	the	reserve	situation	only	
abated	with	Britain’s	 unconditional	withdrawal	 from	 the	 Suez	Canal	 Zone,	with	 dollar	 reserves	
rallying	up	to	£166m	by	the	end	of	the	year.60	
	 Against	 this	 backdrop,	 Financial	 Talks	 between	 Britain	 and	 the	 Federation	 were	 being	
prepared,	 starting	on	December	 17th	1956.	The	Federation	had	begun	 to	worry	 about	 revenues	
after	 independence,	 as	 the	 IBRD’s	 report	 on	 Malaya’s	 economic	 development	 suggested	 that	
rubber	prices	would	 fall	 between	1957	and	1960.61	The	Federation	 then	 sought	 further	 financial	
assistance	 from	the	British	government	but	 the	Colonial	Office	was	 reticent	 to	accede	to,	what	
they	termed,	Malaya’s	“exorbitant	demands”,	considering	them	extremely	unreasonable.62		
	 In	communication	with	 the	Colonial	Secretary,	 the	Commissioner-General	of	South	East	
Asia,	Sir	Robert	Scott,	 reiterated	 the	High	Commissioner’s	 plea	 that	 the	Colonial	Office	 accept	
Malaya’s	 request	 for	 generous	 aid.	 He	 emphasized	 that	 the	 financial	 situation	 in	 Britain	would	
certainly	 be	 better	 suited	 to	 the	 economic	 arguments	 for	 doing	 so	 but	 these	 arguments	
supported	 broader	 political	 ones.63	While	 there	were	 substantial	 British	 investments	 in	Malaya,	
running	 to	 hundreds	 of	millions	 of	 pounds,	 plus	 the	 invisible	 earnings	 accruing	 from	 shipping,	
banking	 and	 insurance,	 this	 was	 not	 the	 best	 argument	 for	 being	 generous	 with	 Malayan	
development	aid.64	
“The	main	economic	argument	for	financial	aid	is,	quite	simply,	dollars.	On	the	
prosperity	 of	Malaya	 and	on	 the	 stability	 of	 its	 economy	depends	 one	 of	 the	
biggest	single	sources	of	American	dollars	at	the	disposal	of	the	Sterling	bloc,	if	
not	 indeed	 the	 biggest	 individual	 source.	 Malaya	 earns	 some	 hundreds	 of	
millions	of	dollars	a	year,	a	quarter	or	more	of	the	total	dollars	accruing	to	the	
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whole	 sterling	 area.	 Surely	 the	 greater	 the	 strain	 on	 sterling,	 the	 greater	 the	
need	to	conserve	such	a	vital	source	of	dollars.	 If	that	can	be	done	by	sterling	
expenditure,	it	is	cheap	at	almost	any	price.”65	
	 Essential	 to	 Malaya’s	 source	 of	 dollars	 was	 the	 rubber	 industry	 and	 Abdul	 Rahman	
contacted	the	Colonial	Secretary	the	day	after	Sir	Robert	Scott’s	letter	to	assure	him	that	rubber	
replantation	was	the	highest	priority	in	the	Federation’s	development	plan.66		
	 The	Colonial	Office	were	 initially	very	concerned	 that	 the	 financial	discussions	would	be	
focused	on	Malaya’s	relationship	with	the	Sterling	Area	and	prepared	another	document	detailing	
the	value	Malaya	gained	from	remaining	in	the	Sterling	Area.67	However,	in	conversation	with	the	
Bank,	the	Colonial	Office	was	informed	that	Malaya’s	position	in	the	Sterling	Area	were	unlikely	to	
come	 up	 again	 since	 the	 issue	 had	 been	 extensively	 covered	 in	 the	 Constitutional	 Talks	 at	 the	
beginning	 of	 1956;	 instead,	 the	 discussions	 were	 most	 likely	 to	 focus	 on	 finance	 for	 Malaya’s	
defence	and	development	programmes.68		
	 Given	Britain’s	weakened	state	following	the	Suez	crisis,	the	Financial	Talks	were	difficult.	
The	Malayan	delegation	demanded	that	Britain	meet	half	the	cost	of	the	Emergency,69	and	help	
to	meet	the	costs	of	Malaya’s	development	plan.	The	Federation	then	asked	for	a	£100m	grant	to	
bridge	the	gap	between	Malaya’s	capacity	and	requirements.70	The	British	delegation	responded	
starkly	by	 saying	 that	 the	British	government	did	not	and	 could	not	give	direct	 financial	 aid	 to	
independent	members	of	the	Commonwealth	for	development	since	it	was	considered	“a	normal	
economic	activity	in	which	any	independent	Government	must	stands	on	its	own	feet”	and	there	
was	 a	 stated	 suspicion	 among	 the	 British	 delegation	 that,	 if	 the	 costs	 were	 spread	 out,	 the	
Federation	 could	 meet	 them.71	The	 Malayan	 delegation,	 which	 included	 Abdul	 Rahman	 and	
Colonel	Lee,	were	extremely	disappointed	with	this	response	from	the	British.	
	 However,	 as	 had	 been	 agreed	 in	 the	 Constitutional	 Talks	 in	 early	 1956,	 Britain	 would	
provide	 financial	aid	 to	meet	 the	costs	of	 the	Malayan	Emergency.	This	was	not	only	 seen	as	a	
contribution	 to	 the	 Emergency	 but	 also	 to	 the	 Federation’s	 development	 plan	 as	 it	 freed	 up	
significant	 resources,	with	 the	development	of	Malaya	 “recognized	 to	be	 in	 itself	 an	 important	
contribution	to	the	fight	against	communism”.72	Britain	agreed	to	provide	an	annual	grant	of	£3m	
each	 year	 for	 the	 following	 three	 years	 and,	 at	 the	 end	 of	 those	 three	 years,	 the	 British	
government	agreed	to	review	the	Federation’s	financial	position	and	then	decide	on	whether	to	
activate	a	fund	of	£11m	for	further	assistance,	to	be	spread	over	the	next	two	years.73	In	addition,	
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Britain	offered	 to	use	already-promised	 funds	of	£6.5m	 to	 the	Federation	 to	 further	expand	 its	
armed	forces,	as	well	as	supplying	equipment	up	to	the	value	of	£5.5m.74	These	amounts	would	be	
in	conjunction	with	a	grant	to	the	Federation	for	development	from	the	unspent	balance	of	the	
Federation’s	Colonial	Development	and	Welfare	allocations	at	 the	date	of	 independence,	which	
was	around	£4.5m.75	In	all,	this	amounted	to	grants	of	nearly	£37m	until	1961,	about	which	both	
Abdul	Rahman	and	Colonel	Lee	were	very	pleased.76		
With	Malayan	capital	expenditure	very	high	at	around	M$260m,	Malaya	needed	as	much	
money	as	it	could	get.	However,	despite	a	recommendation	in	the	IBRD	report	that	Malaya	could	
seek	 local	 development	 loans	worth	 around	M$10m	per	 year	 through	 the	Malayan	Post	Office	
Savings	Bank	(POSB),	the	Bank	of	England	were	extremely	reticent	to	support	this	notion.77	There	
would	 be	 a	 great	 risk	 of	 capital	 loss	 to	 the	 POSB,	 since	 there	 was	 no	 limit	 on	 the	 amount	 of	
government	 stock	 the	POSB	could	purchase,	 the	POSB’s	portfolio	would	be	extremely	 limited,	
and	“in	an	economy	as	dependent	as	the	Federation	on	the	vicissitudes	of	the	world	markets	for	
tin	 and	 natural	 rubber,	 the	 interests	 of	 depositors	 must	 surely	 be	 carefully	 watched	 and	 not	
sacrificed	for	development	expedience”.78	So	while	British	officials	were	eager	for	Malaya	to	have	
as	 much	 cash	 as	 possible	 to	 spend	 on	 development,	 this	 was	 not	 the	 key	 priority	 –	 Malayan	
development	was	instrumental	in	terms	of	dollar	earnings,	but	also	and	importantly,	the	stability	
of	the	economy	and	the	Malayan	political	establishment.	
	 Despite	the	relative	distance	now	from	Suez,	the	effects	were	still	being	felt	in	the	British	
economy,	 including	 the	 prolonging	 of	 oil	 supply	 difficulties;	 however,	 both	 Leslie	 Rowan	 and	
Denis	Rickett	were	sanguine,	in	a	letter	to	Cameron	Cobbold,	about	the	position	of	Sterling	due	to	
the	 resolution	 of	 domestic	 political	 instability	 through	 Eden’s	 resignation	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	
1957,	 and	 the	 boost	 likely	 to	 be	 given	 to	 Sterling	 through	 the	 seasonal	 effect	 on	Sterling	Area	
commodities.79	
	 Bound	 up	 tightly	 with	 the	 issue	 of	 Malayan	 independence,	 and	 the	 value	 of	 Malaya’s	
Sterling	Area	membership,	was	the	issue	of	economic	development.	In	order	for	Malaya	to	remain	
a	 persistent	 and	 consistent	 dollar	 earner,	 the	 British	 state	 had	 to,	 in	 some	 form,	 invest	 in	 the	
Malayan	economy.	This	was	a	point	acknowledged	and	agreed	by	both	Malayan	and	British	state	
officials,	 and	 most	 clearly	 articulated	 by	 Sir	 Robert	 Scott	 by	 placing	 Malaya’s	 continued	
importance	in	the	context	of	Britain’s	continued	economic	vulnerability.	
Independence	Achieved	
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With	independence	granted	to	Malaya	on	31st	August	1957,	Malaya	assumed	a	full	membership	of	
the	Sterling	Area	and	the	Commonwealth.80	An	interview	with	Lord	Kilmuir,	the	Lord	Chancellor,	
was	 arranged	 for	 the	 BBC	 to	 discuss	 Malaya’s	 independence	 from	 the	 British	 Empire	 and	 the	
Treasury	was	asked	to	provide	some	answers	for	the	questions	that	would	be	asked.	Most	of	the	
questions	 focused	 on	 Malaya’s	 membership	 of	 the	 Sterling	 Area,	 and	 the	 Treasury,	 Bank	 and	
Colonial	 Office	 advised	 the	 Lord	 Chancellor	 to	 avoid	 speculative	 answers	 and	 only	 talk	 about	
details	if	pressed,	and	then	only	to	emphasise	the	benefits	of	the	Sterling	Area,	from	information	
which	the	Bank,	Treasury	and	Colonial	Office	had	generated	numerous	times	before	in	persuading	
Malaya	to	remain	as	part	of	the	Sterling	Area	after	independence.81		
	 The	Bank,	however,	suggested	to	Lord	Kilmuir	that	if	the	topic	of	Malaya’s	dollar	earnings	
came	up,	he	should	emphasise	that	Malaya’s	dollar	earnings	could	not	be	considered	in	isolation,	
as	“the	fact	that	she	chooses	to	convert	them	into	Sterling	and	hold	her	reserves	in	that	currency	
instead	of	 in	dollars	enables	her	 to	obtain	 the	advantages	of	Sterling	Area	membership”.82	This	
became	 a	 particularly	 pointed	 issue	 with	Malaya	 seeking	 its	 own	 dollar	 reserves,	 independent	
from	the	Sterling	Area’s	general	pool,	following	independence.83	
Over	a	month	after	Malayan	 independence,	Britain’s	 reserve	position	was	still	extremely	
precarious,	 leading	 the	Chancellor,	Peter	Thorneycroft,	 to	make	 the	 following	statement	 to	 the	
Cabinet:	
“We	 have	 been	 near	 to	 the	 edge	 of	 economic	 disaster.	We	 are	 still	 near	 the	
edge.	Over	the	past	two	months	we	have	lost	£185	millions	from	our	gold	and	
dollar	 reserves.	 The	 reserves	 at	 the	 end	 of	 September	 were	 down	 to	 £660	
millions,	only	two-thirds	of	what	they	were	at	the	end	of	1954,	despite	the	£200	
millions	which	we	drew	from	the	International	Monetary	Fund	(I.M.F.)	last	year	
and	the	£37	millions	which	we	gained	by	not	paying	last	year's	 interest	on	the	
American	loan”.84	
While	 the	Chancellor	 cited	 the	means	of	 supporting	 the	UK	position	 as	 the	dollars	 the	UK	had	
already	borrowed	and	deflationary	domestic	policies,	Malayan	dollars	at	this	point	were	as	crucial	
as	ever	in	propping	up	Britain’s	precarious	reserve	position,	and	discussions	over	Malaya’s	position	
within	the	Sterling	Area	still	retained	particular	significance.	
	 Following	 independence,	 the	 Colonial	 Secretary	 submitted	 to	 Parliament	 his	 Annual	
Report,	 detailing	 the	 events	 in	 Malaya	 up	 to	 31st	 August	 1957.	 His	 report	 revealed	 that	 the	
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Emergency	had	declined	in	seriousness	in	1957	as	it	had	in	the	four	years	previously.	In	fact,	in	July	
1957,	it	was	the	first	month	since	July	1948	in	which	the	Communist	insurgents	did	not	kill	anyone,	
there	were	also	no	reported	casualties	by	the	security	forces	in	Malaya,	and	there	were	no	major	
incidents	relating	to	the	Emergency.85	The	prosecution	of	the	Emergency	was	considered	by	the	
Colonial	Office	to	have	been	extremely	successful	with	around	half	of	the	whole	country	declared	
free	of	insurgent	activity.	Indeed,	by	31st	August	1957,	the	number	of	active	terrorists	had	dropped	
from	a	peak	of	8,000	in	1951	to	around	1,830,	with	an	estimated	10,000	terrorists	killed,	captured	
of	 surrendered	 since	 the	 Emergency	 was	 declared	 in	 1948;	 and	 security	 forces	 had	 suffered	
around	9,000	killed,	wounded	and	missing	in	the	same	time.86	
	 With	independence,	the	insurgency	in	Malaya	lost	its	principal	justification	and	resistance	
to	 Commonwealth	 and	 Malayan	 troops	 dwindled	 swiftly,	 though	 the	 Emergency	 itself	 lasted	
formally	until	 1960.	However,	while	 independence	heralded	 the	 formal	exit	of	Malaya	 from	the	
British	Empire,	 the	 relationship	between	Britain	and	Malaya	 remained	 fundamentally	 the	 same	
through	 the	 institution	 of	 the	 Sterling	 Area.	 Indeed,	 as	 the	 Movement	 for	 Colonial	 Freedom	
argued	at	the	time,	“But	although	politically	free,	Malaya	has	yet	far	to	go	before	she	can	truly	call	
herself	 ‘independent’.	For	even	 in	the	 instrument	of	 independence	—	the	London	Agreement	—	
the	economic	and	military	interests	of	Britain	still	bind	Malaya.”87	
Conclusion	
The	paper	has	 argued	 that	 the	 fundamental	 relationship	between	Britain	 and	Malaya	does	not	
substantially	 change	 following	 formal	 independence,	 as	 the	 relationship	 is	 still	 ultimately	
governed	 by	 the	 logic	 and	 nature	 of	 the	 Sterling	 Area	 mechanism	 as	 a	 means	 of	 managing	
Malayan	 economic	 and	 monetary	 policy	 to	 benefit	 Britain.	 Malaya	 remains	 important	 to	 the	
Sterling	Area	throughout	this	period,	a	 fact	cited	by	officials	 in	the	Bank,	Treasury	and	Colonial	
Office,	due	to	its	large	dollar	earning	capacity	and	the	continued	inability	of	the	Sterling	Area	and	
Britain	 to	 balance	 trade	 with	 the	 dollar	 area,	 which	 is	 revealed	 by	 state	 managers	 and	 also	
through	the	meagre	size	of	Britain’s	(and	the	Sterling	Area’s)	convertible	currency	reserves.	
Even	 after	 independence,	 when	 the	 formal	 vestiges	 of	 empire	were	 removed,	Malaya’s	
relationship	with	Britain	 is	still	managed	by	these	same	factors,	and	they	continue	to	dominate	
the	 relationship.	 Britain	 identified	 in	Malaya	 a	 prime	 support	 for	 the	 Sterling	 Area,	 which	was	
itself	 a	 key	 component	 for	 the	 maintenance	 of	 Sterling	 as	 an	 international	 currency	 and	 for	
Britain’s	 economic	 vitality.	 While	 this	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 Malaya	 was	 essential	 to	 the	 British	
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economy,	 or	 to	 the	 stability	 of	 Sterling,	 it	 certainly	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 strategy	 for	
maintaining	 the	Sterling	Area,	which	 still	 remained	 a	 vital	 component	 of	Britain’s	 international	
economic	 policy.	Without	Malaya,	more	 stringent	 import	 restrictions	 on	 dollar	 area	 goods	 and	
further	emergency	measures,	which	would	have	required	a	significant	change	in	the	quality	of	life	
for	citizens	of	Sterling	Area	countries,	would	have	been	necessary	and	they	would	have	seriously	
retarded	Britain’s	economic	 recovery,	as	well	as	 the	 recovery	of	global	 trade	which	was	vital	 to	
Britain’s	economy.	Indeed,	it	is	worth	noting	that,	in	1957,	Britain	retained	an	annual	trade	deficit	
of	 $667m	with	 the	 United	 States	 and	 British	 reserves	 were	 at	 their	 lowest	 point	 since	 1952.88	
Moreover,	rubber	and	tin	prices	were	over	double	their	averages	in	the	1940s,	while	production	of	
rubber	was	at	its	highest	since	records	began	at	over	630,000	tons,	and	export	income	from	both	
was	over	double	what	it	was	in	1947.	89	
The	various	arguments	brought	up	by	officials	in	the	Bank,	Treasury,	and	Colonial	Office	in	
this	period	concerning	Malaya’s	 role	and	membership	 in	 the	Sterling	Area	are	convincing.	They	
reveal,	 not	 only	 in	 content,	 but	 in	 their	 existence	 and	 the	 frequency	 with	 which	 they	 are	
presented,	Malaya’s	continued	importance	to	the	Sterling	Area,	British	economic	policy	and	the	
nature	of	the	relationship	between	Britain	and	Malaya.	While	Britain	certainly	used	Malaya	to	its	
own	advantage,	Malaya	too	benefitted	from	this	relationship.	The	historical	development	of	trade	
within	the	Sterling	Area	had	seen	Malaya	hold	a	deficit	with	the	UK	and	a	surplus	with	the	US	(the	
very	basis	by	which	she	was	so	valuable	to	the	UK	as	a	dollar	earner),	which	meant	that	exiting	
from	the	Sterling	Area	would	have	been	too	costly	to	reasonably	consider.	This	was	recognised	by	
Malayan	state	officials	both	prior	to	and	after	formal	independence	from	Britain	and	ensured	that	
they	would	continue	to	support	Sterling	Area	membership	due	to	 the	advantages	 it	brought	to	
the	 Malayan	 economy.	 Hence,	 the	 imperial	 relationship	 between	 Britain	 and	 Malaya	 is	
characterised	by	constraints	and	opportunities.	Britain	could	not	mercilessly	exploit	Malaya	since	
development	was	essential	to	its	continued	value	and,	indeed,	Malaya	did	continue	to	be	valuable	
to	Britain	due	to	its	persistent	trade	imbalance	with	the	United	States.	Nor	could	Malaya	simply	
extract	 itself	 from	the	 imperial	 relationship	since	 its	economy	depended	upon	the	continuity	of	
this	relationship.	
This	period	particularly	has	been	seen	in	terms	of	discontinuity.90	However,	looking	at	the	
content	 of	 the	 documents	 in	 both	 Bank	 and	 National	 Archives,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 relationship	
between	 Britain	 and	Malaya	we	 see	 a	 very	 strong	 continuity.	 The	 same	 reasons	 prevail	 in	 this	
period	 that	 prevailed	 prior,	 and	 throughout	 this	 period.	Moments	 one	would	 think	 as	 intuitive	
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caesuras	–	Schenk’s	de	 facto	convertibility,	Hinds	and	Krozewski’s	de	 jure	convertibility,	and	the	
numerous	phases	postulated	by	 the	scholars	of	British	 imperial	history	and	decolonisation	–	do	
not	 obtain.91 	Indeed,	 the	 broader	 interests	 of	 British	 capital-in-general,	 and	 the	 viability	 of	
Sterling	as	an	international	currency,	provide	a	much	more	persuasive	explanation	for	continuity	
between	Britain	and	Malaya’s	relationship	in	this	period.92	
Schenk	argues	that	it	is	unfair	to	characterise	Malayan	monetary	independence	in	terms	of	
the	 shift	 from	 formal	 to	 informal	 empire,	 instead	 focusing	 on	 the	 “underlying	 constraints”	
surrounding	the	Malayan	economy	at	the	time.93	However,	the	“economic	dependence”	Schenk	
refers	 to	 is	 still,	 at	heart,	 the	 core	of	 a	historically	developed	and	unequal	 imperial	 relationship	
between	Britain	and	Malaya.	This	is	not	to	dismiss	Schenk’s	work.	On	the	contrary,	her	analysis	of	
the	 policy	 alternatives	 for	 both	 Britain	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 Sterling	 Area	 clearly	 identifies	 the	
political	 economic	 conditions	 within	 which	 Britain	 manages	 the	 Sterling	 Area,	 and	 why	 the	
Sterling	 Area	 route	 was	 taken.94	However,	 this	 also	 avoids	 framing	 the	 Sterling	 Area	 as	 an	
instrument	of	imperial	rule.	White,	too,	while	acknowledging	the	importance	of	Malaya	as	a	dollar	
earner	 within	 the	 Sterling	 Area	 beyond	 the	 1950s,	 focuses	 instead	 on	 the	 erratic	 and	
discontinuous	 relationship	 between	 business	 and	 government,	 concluding	 that	 business	 never	
meaningfully	influenced	government,	and	thus	rejecting	the	‘gentlemanly	capitalism’	thesis.95	It	is	
that	 importance	 to	 the	 Sterling	 Area,	 and	 the	 desire	 for	 British	 state	 managers	 to	 persuade	
Malayan	state	managers	of	that	importance,	that	this	article	has	sought	to	expand	upon.		
One	 final	 conclusion	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 the	 continued	 value	 of	 looking	 not	 only	 at	 specific	
relationships	within	the	British	Empire,	but	also	considering	these	in	terms	of	the	broader	political	
economy	of	the	time.	The	continued	value	of	Economic	History	to	any	study	of	imperial	relations	
is	 well	 known,	 and	 has	 been	 exhorted	 by	 a	 recent	 special	 issue	 of	 the	 Journal	 of	 Imperial	 and	
Commonwealth	 History;	 however,	 it	 is	 also	 important	 to	 emphasise	 the	 Janus-like	 nature	 of	
politics	and	economics,	and	that	one	cannot	be	fully	understood	without	the	other.96	
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